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  <title>Redthread blog</title>
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  <description>AI risk, agent security, the estate graph, and incident analysis from Redthread Security.</description>
  <language>en</language>
    <item><title>Twenty minutes, $6.3 billion: the Binance heist was an identity failure</title><link>https://redthreadsec.com/blog/binance-heist-identity-failure</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://redthreadsec.com/blog/binance-heist-identity-failure</guid><pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 09:00:00 +0000</pubDate><category>Incident analysis</category><description>The signatures were valid and the systems did what they were told. What failed was verification at the moment billions moved, and that is the architecture every enterprise running agents is building now.</description></item>
    <item><title>The name said Claude Code. The build said otherwise.</title><link>https://redthreadsec.com/blog/fake-claude-code-extension-cursor</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://redthreadsec.com/blog/fake-claude-code-extension-cursor</guid><pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 09:00:00 +0000</pubDate><category>Incident analysis</category><description>A tampered build of a trusted AI coding tool reached up to 5,000 developer machines through an extension marketplace. The tool's identity was a name and a version string, and nothing checked the build behind them.</description></item>
    <item><title>The night the fridges turned against the supermarkets</title><link>https://redthreadsec.com/blog/supermarket-fridges-danfoss-attack</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://redthreadsec.com/blog/supermarket-fridges-danfoss-attack</guid><pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 09:00:00 +0000</pubDate><category>Incident analysis</category><description>Connected refrigeration controllers in hundreds of European supermarkets accepted remote instructions and destroyed their stock. The fridges were the preview: AI agents are the new machines that act on instructions.</description></item>
    <item><title>The FBI wasn't breached through its own walls. It was breached through a vendor's.</title><link>https://redthreadsec.com/blog/fbijobs-vendor-breach</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://redthreadsec.com/blog/fbijobs-vendor-breach</guid><pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 09:00:00 +0000</pubDate><category>Incident analysis</category><description>Attackers reached the FBI's jobs portal through a third-party-managed platform and a missed patch. Vendor risk certified once a year, while the estate changes daily, is the gap continuous, proof-based assessment exists to close.</description></item>
    <item><title>The code your agents trust is changing under you</title><link>https://redthreadsec.com/blog/the-code-your-agents-trust-is-changing</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://redthreadsec.com/blog/the-code-your-agents-trust-is-changing</guid><pubDate>Sat, 24 Oct 2026 09:00:00 +0000</pubDate><category>Agent security</category><description>A package thousands trusted started stealing email after fifteen clean versions — and nothing warned anyone. What our daily signed scan of the MCP registry sees, and the layer missing underneath.</description></item>
    <item><title>Listing Swap: 1,075 MCP servers now point somewhere new under the same name</title><link>https://redthreadsec.com/blog/mcp-listing-swap</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://redthreadsec.com/blog/mcp-listing-swap</guid><pubDate>Sat, 10 Oct 2026 09:00:00 +0000</pubDate><category>Research</category><description>We compared every server in the official MCP registry with the first version published under its name. 1,075 now reach a different domain or package owner, most with an unchanged description, and nothing in an MCP client asks again.</description></item>
    <item><title>Why pentesters don't trust AI pentesting, and what would earn it</title><link>https://redthreadsec.com/blog/why-pentesters-dont-trust-ai-pentesting</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://redthreadsec.com/blog/why-pentesters-dont-trust-ai-pentesting</guid><pubDate>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 09:00:00 +0000</pubDate><category>Pentesting</category><description>Willingness to rely on fully autonomous AI testing fell from 29% to 9% in a year. The objections are specific, and each one maps to a design rule.</description></item>
    <item><title>The agent climbed the fence: what the Medicare portal incident means for companies running AI agents</title><link>https://redthreadsec.com/blog/agent-climbed-the-fence-medicare-portal</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://redthreadsec.com/blog/agent-climbed-the-fence-medicare-portal</guid><pubDate>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 09:00:00 +0000</pubDate><category>Agent security</category><description>The data touched was low-risk, and the notice to the government came 84 days after the access. The control failures are the lesson.</description></item>
    <item><title>Hugging Face and OpenAI: a breach that changed its own attribution</title><link>https://redthreadsec.com/blog/hugging-face-openai-breach-attribution</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://redthreadsec.com/blog/hugging-face-openai-breach-attribution</guid><pubDate>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 09:00:00 +0000</pubDate><category>Agent security</category><description>Hugging Face looked like the victim of an autonomous AI attacker. Five days later OpenAI said the attacker was its own model. The lessons are older than the headline.</description></item>
    <item><title>Agentic Trust &amp; Protection Platform: an identity, a record, and — soon — a checkpoint for every AI agent</title><link>https://redthreadsec.com/blog/agent-trust-fabric</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://redthreadsec.com/blog/agent-trust-fabric</guid><pubDate>Sat, 26 Sep 2026 09:00:00 +0000</pubDate><category>Agentic Trust &amp; Protection Platform</category><description>What ATPP gives an agent today, what the ATPP Enforce preview adds, and — just as important — what we do not yet claim.</description></item>
    <item><title>The agent that was blocked, so it found another way: what the Services Australia incident teaches</title><link>https://redthreadsec.com/blog/agent-blocked-so-it-found-another-way</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://redthreadsec.com/blog/agent-blocked-so-it-found-another-way</guid><pubDate>Sat, 26 Sep 2026 09:00:00 +0000</pubDate><category>Agent security</category><description>An AI research agent hit an access block on an Australian government service and kept going until something worked. What actually failed, and how we designed around it.</description></item>
    <item><title>Agentless and graph-first: why we start with a map, and where the time and money go</title><link>https://redthreadsec.com/blog/agentless-graph-security</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://redthreadsec.com/blog/agentless-graph-security</guid><pubDate>Sat, 26 Sep 2026 09:00:00 +0000</pubDate><category>Platform</category><description>Installing agents everywhere and triaging flat lists of findings are the two biggest hidden costs in security tooling. Here is how an agentless graph removes them.</description></item>
    <item><title>What an AI penetration test costs — and what it does not replace</title><link>https://redthreadsec.com/blog/ai-pentest-cost-and-efficiency</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://redthreadsec.com/blog/ai-pentest-cost-and-efficiency</guid><pubDate>Sat, 26 Sep 2026 09:00:00 +0000</pubDate><category>Pentesting</category><description>A manual pentest is a large, infrequent purchase. Autonomous agents make it small and frequent. The honest comparison, including the parts humans still do better.</description></item>
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