MCP is stuck between the laptop and production. Security is the reason.
In Stacklok's July 2026 survey of enterprise engineers, 86% of MCP use is still experimentation or local development, only 5% runs governed, enterprise-wide production, and 49% name security and compliance as the biggest blocker. OWASP lists tool poisoning (MCP03) and shadow MCP servers (MCP09) in its MCP Top 10. A team approves a server by its name; the code behind the name keeps moving. Our signed scan of the whole registry this week:
Figures: Redthread's daily signed scan of 42,172 servers in the official MCP registry, 12 October 2026. Survey: Stacklok, State of MCP in Software 2026. OWASP MCP Top 10.
Know which agents you can trust — in real time, not in last quarter's report.
From proof to protection: real-time trust signals for every agent in your environment.
Agentic Trust & Protection Platform is the next step: it gives every agent in that graph a durable, cryptographically verified identity — built on SPIFFE, the open industry standard for workload identity, not a proprietary lock-in — and turns Redthread's proof into a live signal. The moment an agent is proven exploitable, or a fix is verified, a signed trust-state event broadcasts to whatever is orchestrating your agents: green means verified safe, red means proven unsafe, right now. No new dashboard to babysit. No waiting for the next scan cycle.
One toggle turns it on. No agent rewrites, no new infrastructure to run yourself.
A new operating model for AI-era security
One context graph runs all three teams — from code to cloud to agent identity to defend. Red proves it, Green prevents it, Blue stops it.
From first commit to continuous coverage: one agentic security lifecycle.
It starts with the graph. Everything that follows reads from it, writes back to it, and hands its context to the next step.
Four things the graph makes possible.
Each of these reads the same estate the steps above built — which is why a change can be judged against what is already true in production.
- A baseline per target — only what changed is re-covered
- An unchanged commit short-circuits: no scan, no charge
- Recon carryover reuses the learned architecture and endpoints
- Excessive-agency and tool-abuse testing
- What the agent’s identity can actually reach, through the graph
- The gap between scoped and reachable is what you constrain
- A minimal patch as a draft pull request on your own repo
- Located by the identifiers the finding names — vendored and minified files excluded
- Dependency updates proposed per CVE, with VEX decisions exported
- The PR gate fails a change that would introduce an attack path
- The GitHub Action gates the build — fail-on critical, high, medium, low, or never
- A ticket in Jira or ServiceNow with the full path attached